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Member Institute International Air Law, McGill University,
1951-1952, University of London, LL.B., 1951.
T HE first two Articles of the Convention of Internationl Civil
Aviation signed at Chicago in 1944 state:
ARTICLE 1-The contracting States recognize that every State has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its ter-
ritory.
ARTICLE 2-For the purpose of this Convention the territory of.
a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters
adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or
mandate of such State.'
These Articles are an almost exact reiteration of Article 1 of the
Paris Convention of 1919, which for the first time embodied in an
International Convention the theory of territorial sovereignty in the
airspace. It is important to note, however, that though this is so, never-
theless it was not in 1919 that this principle was first born. Many states,
including particularly Great Britain,2 France and Germany had already
accepted this principle of sovereignty and had embodied it in their
national acts and decrees. The true position is that in 1919, the con-
tracting States laid down in Article 1 a principle which they - as well
as some non-contracting States - recognized as a basic rule of inter-
national air law. It will be noted that the two Articles of the Chicago
Convention quoted above confine the area over which a state exercises
sovereignty, to the airspace "above its territory." From this reservation
we may deduce the "second part" of the rule of international law, viz.
that a state does not have any sovereign rights over the airspace above
and land or sea which is not itself under the sovereignty of that state.8
The rule has been admirably stated by a well-known authority in
this field in the following words:
I International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, Illinois, 1944. Final Act
and related Documents. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945 p. 59.
2 Air Navigation Act, 1911 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c 4.
3 Report of the Legal Sub-committee of Aeronautical Commission, Paris Con-
ference, 1919: "The opinion which was developed in the legal sub-committee is
favorable to the full and exclusive subjection of the airspace to the sovereignty
of the territory underlying it. It is only when the column of air rests upon a
res nullius or communis, the sea, that freedom becomes the rule of the air. Thus
the airspace shares the jurisdiction of the underlying territory. Is this territory
that of an individual State? If so, the airspace is subject to the sovereignty of
the State. Is it, like the high sea, free of sovereignty? Then the airspace is as
free above the sea as the sea itself."
See also: Article 12, Chicago Convention. "... Over the high seas, the rules
in force shall be those established under this Convention ..
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"If any area on the surface of the earth, whether land or water,
is recognized as part of the territory of a State, then the airspace
over such area is also part of the territory of the same State. Con-
versely, if an area on the earth's surface is not part of the territory
of any State, such as the water areas included in the high seas,
then the airspace over such surface areas is not subject to the sov-
ereign control of any State, and is free for the use of all States.
' 4
By taking this basic rule and applying it strictly, it is possible to
determine the legal status - according to accepted international law -
of a very large proportion of the total airspace above the world's surface.
But even in the middle of the "enlightened 20th century" interesting
problems still arise about the incidence of sovereignty in the airspace
above certain areas, and, especially so, over various sea or water areas.
In this connection, the right to sovereign power over the two great
canals of Suez and Panama, and also above the Bosphorus and Darda-
nelles, present situations of great interest. Strictly speaking, the posi-
tion of the Suez Canal is well settled. But even although Article 8 of
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 19365 recognizes the exclusive sovereignty
of Egypt, nevertheless there does seem to be a de facto splitting of sov-
eignty over the canal and the canal zone.
The position of the Panama Canal is slightly different. No one will
question the fact that the U.S. has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the surface area, but nevertheless the Republic of Panama has
intimated that it is Panama and not the U.S. which has sovereignty
in the airspace above this area. As these two canals represent probably
the two most important waterways in the world, it will be interesting
and useful to study the position in greater detail.
Taking, therefore, as our basis, the first two Articles of the Chicago
Convention which enunciate the fundamental rule of international
law governing the status of the airspace above the earth's surface, it
is necessary to consider how the positions of the Suez and Panama
Canals, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus either conform to or deviate
from the normal rule.
THE SUEZ CANAL
As stated above, the status of the airspace above the Suez Canal
seems to be well settled. The position was governed in the years im-
mediately prior to the Chicago Convention by the Anglo-Egyptian
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance 1936.c In Article 3 of the Treaty,
Egypt is recognized by the Government of the U.K. as a sovereign
independent State. Article 8, which provides for the stationing of
British Forces in the Canal Zone concludes with the following words:
"... The presence of these Forces shall not constitute in any man-
ner an occupation, and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights
of Egypt."
4 J. C. Cooper, "Airspace Rights over the Arctic," Air Affairs, Vol. III, 1950,
p. 517.
5 League of Nations, Treaty Series. Vol. 173, No. 4031, 1937.
6 League of Nations, Treaty Series. Vol. 173, No. 4031, 1937.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Thus appears in the first part of the Treaty a categorical restatement
of the sovereignty of Egypt over the land areas of the Canal Zone,
which of necessity extends to the airspace above. A consideration of
these articles alone would leave no doubt as to the exclusive rights of
Egypt to sovereignty above the Canal, but a difficulty arises immediately
when one attemps to construe Paragraph 11 of the Annex. This states:
"Unless the two Governments agree to the contrary, the Egyptian
Government will prohibit the passage of aircraft over the territories
situated on either side of the Suez Canal and within 20 km. of it,
except for the purpose of passage from East to West or vice-versa
by means of a corridor 10 km. wide at Cantara. This prohibition
will not however apply to the Forces of the High Contracting Par-
ties or to genuinely Egyptian Air Organizations, or to Air Organi-
zations genuinely belonging to any part of the British Common-
wealth of Nations operating under the Authority of the Egyptian
Government."
The first words of this paragraph -"Unless the two Governments agree
to the contrary"- appear to be a definite incursion on the complete
and exclusive sovereignty of Egypt. It seems difficult to uphold the
contention that one government has complete and exclusive sovereignty,
if the consent of another State is necessary before that government
can allow foreign aircraft to fly over its territory. The Treaty did not
merely accord to the U.K. a privilege of flying over the Canal Zone
to the exclusion of other foreign powers, but it actually conferred a
legal right to do so. 7 Furthermore, the government of the U.K. could,
as of right, object to the granting of permission by Egypt for aircraft
of other states to fly over the Canal. The granting of these rights seems
to constitute a distinct restriction on the full sovereignty of Egypt, and
conversely they give a certain degree of sovereign power to the U.K.
To use the words of a noted historian, Britain seems to have wished
''to retain the substance of control while conceding the shadow of
independence." 8
It is submitted that whatever force one many ascribe to the declara-
tions of the sovereign rights of Egypt in Article 3 and Article 8, one
cannot feel that Paragraph 11 of the Annex provides a definite limita-
tion. One is inclined to draw an analogy with the rights of a littoral
state in the territorial waters adjacent to its coast. It will not be denied
that the littoral state has sovereignty in those waters, but its sovereignty
is limited by the right which foreign ships have to innocent passage.
In the case of the airspace above the Suez Canal, however, the rights
of the U.K. are even more extensive. Not only is there a right of in-
nocent passage for British aircraft, but also a right for the British
Government to prohibit Egypt from giving this right to the aircraft
of other states.
The Treaty of 1936 did not, however, grant to the civil aircraft
7 It is submitted that this is in fact an example of the reservation by the
U.K. of one of the rights which it previously had under the occupation regime
prior to the 1936 Treaty.
8 G. M. Gathorne-Hardy: A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1939.
3d Ed. Oxford University Press, p. 226.
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of the U.K. a landing right on Egyptian territory. The practice in
this respect was the usual one of requiring permission from the Egyp-
tian Government. So it is seen that the split sovereignty" mentioned
above seems to have been confined to the Canal Zone.
This state of affairs seems to have continued some time after the
signing of the Chicago Convention. (The special arrangements in
force during the war need not be mentioned here as they were purely
temporary measures.) After the Chicago Convention came into force,
however, it was obvious that this arrangement became inconsistent
with the spirit of the Convention and in order to comply with the
stipulation inArticle 82, Egypt, with the concurrence of Great Britain
designated a new.prohibited area which was communicated to ICAO.
This area, stated briefly, extends from the eastern bank of the Suez
Canal to the Egypt-Palestine border. There is now no restricted area
on the western side of the Canal. Thus the position today9 is that the
aircraft of all contracting states now have the privilege of flying over all
Egyptian territory except the prohibited area. There is now no legal
prohibition against civil aircraft of contracting states on non-scheduled
flights or authorized scheduled flights, from navigating over the Canal
itself. But in practice, all aircraft tend to fly a certain distance to the
west of the Canal because of the great difficulty in exactly delimiting
the air boundry between the prohibited and non-prohibited Zone.
It seems then that Paragraph 11 of the Annex to the 1936 Treaty
has lost its force, with the result that the limitation on Egyptian sov-
ereignty-in the airspace above the Suez Canal which it caused has also
disappeared. It is a debatable point whether the freedom of action
granted to military aircraft over the Canal is also a limitation on
Egyptain sovereignty. If the concluding words of Article 8 quoted above
are strictly construed then it would appear that the U.K. Government
takes the view that no such limitation is intended, and so any discussion
of the question would be, of necessity, merely academic.
THE PANAMA CANAL
The question as to which State has sovereign rights in the airspace
above the other great Canal - the Panama Canal - has also been
subject to controversy. The interested parties to this question are the
Republic of Panama and the United States of America. The Canal
is situated geographically within the boundries of the former State
but when it was constructed, the U.S. was granted a lease of the Canal
site itself and also of a zone on either side of it. This lease, contained
in the Hay-Varilla Convention of 1903,10 in terms, gave to the U.S.
complete sovereignty in the entire Zone.1 Although Article 2 makes
9 This section deals with the legal position immediately prior to the recent
unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty by Egypt.
10 Convention between the United States and Panama for the construction of
a Canal to connect the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Signed at
Washington 18th November, 1903. A.J.I.L., Vol. 3 (Supp.) 1909.
11 Art. 3 reads: The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the
rights, power and authority within the Zone mentioned and described in Article 2
of this Agreement, and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters men-
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specific mention only of the surface area, nevertheless it has always
been read by the U.S., in conjunction with Article 3, to include the
grant of sovereignty in the superincumbent airspace, and they have
acted according to this construction. But the Government of Panama
has always opposed this contention, basing their objections on the
fact that it was never intended to include sovereignty in the airspace.
The attitude of the U.S. has been that, were this so, then there should
have been an express reservation to that effect in the agreement itself.
Whatever the merits of these respective arguments may be, there
is no question at all as to which state in fact exercises sovereign rights
in the airspace above the Zone. The U.S. has from the very beginning
issued and enforced very extensive regulations governing the whole
area and the airspace above. Probably the best examples of this
exercise of sovereignty may be found in the presidential Proclamations
regulating and in some cases prohibiting flight by the aircraft of
belligerents over the Canal in the two World Wars. Shortly after the
outbreak of World War I, the President of the U.S. issued a Proclama-
tion governing both the passage of ships through the Canal and flight
over it.12 The operative rule reads:
"Aircraft of a belligerent, public or private, are forbidden to
descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the U.S. at the Canal
Zone, or to pass through the airspaces above the lands and waters
within the said jurisdiction."
A further proclamation with variations and additions was issued on
May 13th, 1917, shortly after the entry of the U.S. into the War.'8 Rule
13 of this proclamation uses exactly the same wording as the rule quoted
above from the 1914 document with the addition of the words "other
than the U.S." after the word "belligerent." These two rules leave no
doubt whatsoever as to the attitude of the U.S. towards the legal status
of the airspace above the Canal Zone, and it must be emphasized that
these regulations were strictly enforced throughout the war, and no
foreign State ever questioned the right of the U.S. to issue such regula-
tions. They were accepted and adhered to by all belligerent States.
Similar regulations were made during World War II with the same
results. An Executive Order by the President issued on September 12,
1939 after setting apart the whole Canal Zone including the territorial
waters extending to three miles at each end, as a military airspace
reservation, enacts in Section 2 that:
"It shall be unlawful to navigate any foreign or domestic aircraft
into, within, or through the Canal Zone Military Airspace Reserva-
tion otherwise than in conformity with this Executive Order, pro-
vided however that none of the provisions of this Order shall apply
to military, naval or other public aircraft of the United States.' 4
tioned and described in said Art. 2, which the U. S. would possess and exercise
if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are
located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any
such sovereign rights, power or authority. (Italics are mine.)12 Proclamation No. 1287 (1914), Amer. Jrnl. of Intl. Law, Vol. 9 (Suppl.).
13 Proclamation No. 1371, May 23, 1917, A.J.I.L., Vol. 19 (Suppl.).
14 Exec. 0. 8251, Sept. 12, 1939, A.J.I.L., Vol. 34, Suppl. p. 32.
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It is noticed that there is here no complete prohibition of flight as in
the 1914 and 1917 proclamations, but even so this Order clearly
demonstrates the assumption and exercise of sovereign power by
the U.S.
Not only in wartime, but in peacetime also, the U.S. has always
enforced very strict regulations over all flying in the area, and apart
from periodic counterclaims to sovereignty by Panama, an interesting
example of which is the reservation made by her delegates when signing
the Chicago Convention, 5 no state has questioned their legality.
Thus it can be stated with conviction that the U.S. certainly enjoys
de facto sovereignty over the Canal Zone and it is suggested that the
adherence by all foreign states to the regulations made by the U.S.,
indicates that the generally accepted view is that it also has de jure
sovereignty over that Zone.
THE DARDANELLES AND BosPHORUS
Passing now from the legal status of the airspace above the two
great artificial waterways, it is necessary to consider the status of air-
space above the very important natural waterways of the Dardanelles,
Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora, usually known as the Straits.
Since the end of World War I, the position has been governed by two
Conventions - the first signed at Lausanne in 192316 and the second
signed at Montreux in 193617 - but in order to appreciate the gTeat
change effected by these Conventions it is necessary to glance briefly
at the situation before 1914. Up to the outbreak of the First World
War, Turkey, as the littoral State, exercised complete sovereignty over
the surface of the Straits, and no foreign shipping could pass into the
Black Sea without her permission. A number of conventions had been
concluded, however, and bilateral agreements had been entered into
with foreign states which allowed passage for merchant shipping, but
the Straits were completely closed to the warships of all non-Black
Sea Powers. Russia, the only other Black Sea Power, had an agreement
with Turkey which allowed passage in peacetime for stated purposes
such as repair. In the same way, flight over the Straits was prohibited
to foreign States. Thus it is seen that prior to World War I the Straits
and the airspace above were subject to the complete sovereignty of
Turkey, and it is clear that the rights flowing from this were very
jealously guarded. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to appreciate
the major importance of the Convention signed at Lausanne in 1923
15 "Because of its strategic position and responsibility in the protection of
the means of communication in its territory, which are of the utmost importance
to world trade, and vital to the defence of the Western Hemisphere, the Republic
of Panama reserves the right to take, with respect to all flights through the air-
space above its territory, all measures which in its judgment may be proper for
its own security or the protection of said means of communication."
16 Convention on the Regime of the Straits signed at Lausanne July 24, 1923.
28 League of Nations Treaty Series, p. 115-Hudson, Intl. Leg. Vol. 2, No. 95.
17 Convention on the Regime of the Straits signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936.
173 L.O.N. Treaty Series p. 213-Hudson, Intl. Leg. Vol. 7, No. 449.
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governing the future regime of the Straits, particularly so the first two
Articles which read:
ARTICLE 1-The High Contracting Parties agree to recognize and
declare the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea
and by air in the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora
and the Bosphorus hereinafter comprised under the general term
of "the Straits."
ARTICLE 2-The transit and navigation of commercial vessels and
aircraft and of war vessels and of aircraft in the Straits in time
of war shall henceforth be regulated- by the provisions of the at-
tached Annex.
Annex la. governs the passage of merchant vessels and non-military
aircraft in time of peace and reads:
"Complete freedom of navigation by day and by night under any
flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities or tax or
charge whatever unless for services directly rendered, such as pilot-
age, light, towage or other similar charges and without prejudice
to the rights exercised in this respect by the services and undertak-
ings now operating under concessions granted by the Turkish Gov-
ernment ......
Thus from being closed waters under the complete and exclusive
sovereignty of Turkey the Straits were for the first time opened to the
free transit of shipping and aircraft of all States, under the jurisdiction
of an international Commission, comprised of representatives of all the
signatory States including Turkey.18
The provisions of this Convention and the regulations made under
it governed both sea and air navigation from 1923 until the Montreux
Convention of 1936. The main principle of freedom of transit and
navigation first enunciated at Lausanne was, however, not changed in
1936. In fact, it was specifically preserved and reaffirmed at Montreux.
"All that was altered was the incidence of that right and the detailed
conditions under which navigation and transit were to be effected." 1
The International Commission relinquished its powers to the Turkish
Government who undertook to guard the interests of all States accord-
ing to the Convention. The structure of the Montreux document,
however, differs slightly from the 1923 Convention, in that the question
of air navigation is dealt with in a separate article.
"ARTICLE 23-In order to assure the passage of civil aircraft
between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Turkish govern-
ment will indicate the air routes available for this purpose outside
the forbidden zones which may be established in the Straits. Civil
aircraft may use these routes provided that they give the Turkish
Government as regards occasional flights a notificatioh of three
days, and as regards regular service, a general notification of the
dates of passage. ..
The regime set up by this Convention is still in force, and all flight
over the Straits is governed by the regulations made under it.
18 Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, Russia,
Jugoslavia and Turkey.
19 British Yearbook of International Law, 1937, p. 187.
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Turkey, as one of the States which signed and ratified the Chicago
Convention of 1944, agreed to abide by the terms and recommendations
contained in that document. It is interesting to note that no action was
necessary to amend Article 23 of the Montreux Convention as a result
of Article 82 of the Chicago Convention because Article 23 is not in-
consistent with any of the terms of the Chicago Document. The estab-
lishment of prohibited areas in the Straits - see Article 23 - is also in
conformity with the provisions of Article 9 Chicago Convention. It
can therefore be concluded that the present r6gime for air navigation
above the Straits is in full accord with the general principle of air
navigation accepted at Chicago in 1944. In fact the rights granted to
foreign aircraft by the Montreux Convention - first established at
Lausanne in 1923 - are even more liberal than those contained in the
Chicago Convention. Article 5 of the Chicago Convention contains only
the grant of a privilege of flight over the territory of a contracting State
to non-scheduled air services of another contracting State. By Article 6
special authorization is necessary before similar privilege may be
granted to aircraft on scheduled services. Article 23 of the Montreux
Convention on the other hand gives a right - not a mere privilege -
of free passage to all foreign aircraft and it is not confined to non-
scheduled services or to aircraft of the parties to the Convention. The
regime set Up by the Convention has been applied by Turkey vis-A-vis
the whole world, and countries not parties to either the Lausanne or
the Montreux Conventions could with the passage of time be presumed
to have accepted the regime in question, having made no objection to
its application towards themselves. In the same way they might be
regarded as having a vested interest in such benefits as the regime might
entail. The Turkish Government itself recognized this and in the
discussions which took place immediately prior to the drafting of the
Montreux Convention the Turkish Delegation spoke of the Lausanne
Convention as being something different from a treaty in the ordinary
sense of the term, "that is to say, as a purely contractual arrangement
between a number of States giving and receiving consideration. Rather
it was to be regarded, as indeed were all the Straits Conventions, as a
species of general act or statute. Its nature was less that of a contract
than of a piece of statute law, which once 'passed' so to speak became
law universally and not merely for those who had laid it down. '20 This
statement strengthens the view that the Lausanne and Montreux Con.
ventions granted rights, stricto sensu, of innocent passage to ships and
aircraft of all the world through and over Turkish waters, which is
much wider than the privilege granted in Article 5 of the Chicago
Convention.
The basic rule of airspace sovereignty is borne out by the situation
prevailing over the three areas under consideration. The principle
enunciated in the first two articles of the Chicago Convention is not
deviated from in any of these areas, although exercise of sovereign power
over the Dardanelles differs in some respects from normal practice.
20 British Yearbook of International Law, 1937, p. 188.
